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Abstract
Taking into consideration the obvious fact that Kremlin`s threatening and manipulative 
rhetoric is increasingly loud and severe, energy security problem is accordingly high on 
the European Union agenda. The paper analyses the importance of the Southern Gas 
Corridor - a planned infrastructure project in terms of its role in improving the security 
and diversity of the EU’s energy supply by bringing natural gas from the Caspian region 
to Europe. The article discusses if Southern Gas Corridor is a window of opportunity 
for Europe to lessen Russian Gas dependence significantly or just a myth. Besides, the 
paper reviews a strategic logic of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Italian market as 
a final destination of the project. In the end, direct economic benefits from the Southern 
Gas Corridor are presented for the countries participating in this project.
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European Union stays fragile to external energy challenges 
and consequently needs an effective energy security strate-
gy that will contribute to its resilience towards energy supply 
shocks in the near future and substantially lessen depen-
dency on Russian gas in the long term.
Figure 1: Map of Southern Gas Corridor. Source: Trans Adriatic Pipeline, 2016.
Literature Review
Taking into consideration today`s picture that Kremlin uses 
threatening and manipulative rhetoric increasingly loudly 
and severely, energy security problem is accordingly high 
on the European Union agenda. EU stays fragile to external 
energy challenges and consequently needs an effective en-
Introduction
EU member states are collectively the world’s largest ener-
gy importer. The EU imports more than half of all the energy 
it consumes.  Its import dependency is particularly high for 
crude oil (more than 90%) and natural gas (66%). The total 
import bill is more than €1 billion per day (European Com-
mission. Energy Security Strategy). The European Com-
mission forecasts that the EU will import over 80% of its 
natural gas needs by 2030 (Ratner, Belkin, Nichol & Woeh-
rel, 2013).
Energy security affects all Member States but is particu-
larly problematic for Baltic and central and eastern European 
states, some of which are entirely dependent on Russia for 
gas supplies. Russian supply accounts for a third of gas 
and oil imports into the EU, while the ongoing conflict in 
Ukraine (a major transit route for Russian gas) highlights the 
risks associated with this external dependence (European 
Parliament, 2015). So, "regarding energy supply security 
between European Union Commission and Russia; the gas 
shortages the Union countries experienced, Russia’s mo-
nopoly policies, rising gas prices and finally the 2006 cri-
sis between Russia and Ukraine forced Europe to produce 
alternative policies on new supply routes" (Belet, 2014, 
pp.87). Accordingly, there is high necessity of having alter-
native supply routes: "Europe needs new sources of gas to 
meet its long-term energy demand, replace its own declin-
ing energy production, fuel economic growth and diversify 
energy supply" (TAP, 2016). The current picture shows that 
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ergy security strategy to diversify supply routes in order to 
meet its long-term energy demand and lessen dependence 
on Russia. From this perspective, Southern Gas Corridor 
(SGC) - a planned infrastructure project is seen as a possi-
ble way out to improve the security and diversity of the EU’s 
energy supply by bringing Caspian gas to Europe.
Southern Gas Corridor is discussed by Kalandadze 
(2014) in terms of "appropriate and timely solution" (pp.57) 
and mentions that it is "more than a welcome initiative" 
(pp.67) because this project has a capacity to play a sig-
nificant role in the context of diversifying natural gas supply 
and routes. For the EU it does not mean that SGC can total-
ly substitute Russian gas. Initially, it will carry 10 bcm gas to 
Europe and it means just 2% of the EU’s gas consumption. 
The author points out that its strategic significance lies not 
necessarily in its capacity of replacement but in diversifica-
tion.
It is important to state here that in order for this project 
to be successfully implemented, stabilization in the South 
Caucasian states will be more than crucial. The region 
suffers from instability and it is necessary for the West to 
take effective measures in order to contribute to the conflict 
management: "conflict resolution needs to become a central 
component of the EU’s broader energy security strategy, in 
order to safeguard the potential of the entire concept" (Ka-
landadze, 2014, pp. 67).
Southern Gas Corridor is seen as an opportunity for the 
EU gas diversification but especially as a relief for those 
countries which suffer from total dependence on Russian 
gas. Akhunzada (2015) states that Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP), which is one of the components of SGC can provide 
natural gas to countries such as Albania, Kosovo and Mon-
tenegro, which lack an indigenous natural gas market. This 
means reducing monopoly of Russia over countries that are 
almost entirely dependent on Russian natural gas.
The importance of Southeast European and Balkan 
countries as a market destination is also discussed by 
Belet (2014). The author states that they have a potential 
of becoming the EU members and it will make them signifi-
cant models for diversification of natural gas resources and 
routes to suffer less from Kremlin`s challenges: "When we 
take into account that only the Russian gas is sold at these 
markets, new gas stream of the East over Turkey will weak-
en Russia in this game" (Belet, 2014. pp.96-97).
The selection of Italy as a final destination of SGC is not 
surprising and has it is logic because from southern part 
of the country it is possible to deliver gas northwards and 
moreover, to transport gas from the Mediterranean to the 
North Sea, including the countries along the pipeline (The 
Jamestown Foundation, 2013). It is interesting to note here 
that Azerbaijan will substantially strengthen its Western 
partnership because Caspian gas is an effective opportuni-
ty for the EU and "a step towards complementing Russia’s 
quasi-monopolistic position in Europe, and make it some-
what more difficult for the Kremlin to dominate the gas mar-
ket in the EU" (Cohen, 2014, pp. 3-4).
It can be said that Southern gas Corridor has pivotal im-
portance and there are numerous reasons that undoubtedly 
make this project valid and prospective.  Not to repeat again 
how beneficial it is for the EU`s diversification of sources 
and routes of energy supply and the expectation that the 
EU will be more dependent on more gas import in the next 
years this project will contribute a lot to establishing a more 
competitive price for natural gas in the European market. 
Koranyi (2014) underlines the issue about the Southern 
Corridor that "it will be essential in stabilizing the volatile 
region of the South Caucasus by anchoring Azerbaijan to 
the Euro-Atlantic community" (pp.3-4).
Livanios (2013) in his article mentions three major risks 
for the SGC but in the end highlights its potential that can 
effect on EU future energy security and the importance that 
lies in the project. The current situation shows, that despite 
the fact that from the very beginning of the project com-
pletion Southern Corridor cannot substitute Russian gas, it 
will play an important role in energy diversification. How-
ever, later the EU can be free from suffering that comes 
from Kremlin`s leverage: "The Caspian gas resources have 
the potential to be the most strategic supplies to the energy 
security of EU. The strong leadership and the effective de-
cision making on crucial gas infrastructure, will determine 
the future of European energy security” (Livanios, 2013, pp. 
17).
Sefocvic (2015) in his paper reviews the key role of the 
Caspian region and underlines how crucial the project is: 
"The delivery of gas volumes from Azerbaijan to South-East 
Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor would significantly 
reinforce gas supply diversification in the region, which until 
now has been predominantly supplied by one major gas 
supplier" (pp.7-8). So, taking into consideration the obvi-
ous advantages of SGC project, its contribution in terms of 
political and economic independence of the region is more 
than clear. Besides, how much Azerbaijan will benefit from 
European markets economically and politically is also ap-
parent. Moreover, as transit countries Georgia and Turkey 
will also benefit from “Russia-free” supplies as well as extra 
substantial revenues. No doubt, Southern Gas Corridor is a 
window of opportunity for Europe.
Why Does Europe Need
Alternative Supply Routes?
The EU imports 53% of the energy it consumes (European 
Commission, 2014), and the diversification of energy sources 
and suppliers is the key means of improving the EU’s ener-
gy security. Sefcovic (2015), underlines the importance of 
properly addressing this issue: "the EU needs to diversify 
supply, moderate demand, and put in place new preventive 
measures and emergency plans at all levels.
Exploring new supply regions for fuels, exploring new 
technologies, further developing indigenous resources and 
improving infrastructure to access new sources of supply 
are all elements that will contribute to the increased diversi-
fication and security of Europe’s energy sector" (pp.7).
In February 2015, the European Commission presented 
the Energy Union plan in order to deal with the situation, to 
lessen this dependence, and to create a single European 
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energy market. "Europe is also heavily dependent on one 
single supplier, namely Russia, responsible for a third of oil 
imports, 39% of gas and 29% of solid fuels. Six EU coun-
tries depend on Russia as the supplier for their entire gas 
imports. Towards increased energy security The EU is now 
seeking to reduce this dependence by diversifying energy 
sources and suppliers, cutting back on energy consum- 
ption, boosting energy production and cooperation between 
countries and investing in renewables."(The European Par-
liament, 2014, pp.1).
Sefcovic (2015) reviews that from this perspective the 
Southern Gas Corridor has a pivotal importance: "with its 
extended value chain, from gas production in the Caspian to 
the construction of infrastructure inside the European Union 
– remains a crucial project. The delivery of gas volumes 
from Azerbaijan to South-East Europe via the Southern Gas 
Corridor would significantly reinforce gas supply diversifica-
tion in the region, which until now has been predominantly 
supplied by one major gas supplier" (pp.7-8).
It is important to underline a strategic location of Azer-
baijan and its crucial role here. The country that stands "at 
the fault line of a more fundamental competition — the com-
petition for resources between East and West. For Europe, 
it is important to secure strategic interests by ensuring that 
natural gas from Azerbaijan can flow to the continent as 
promptly and efficiently as possible. The practical realiza-
tion of this strategic objective is the Southern Gas Corridor 
and the Shah Deniz gas field will kick start the entire pro-
cess of bringing Caspian gas to Europe" (The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2013).
A huge bulk of European energy imports come from the 
three major gas suppliers of Europe, namely Norway, Alge-
ria, and Russia (Ratner, et al., 2013). The proportions are 
as following: Norway 30%, Russia 39% and Algeria 13% 
(European Commission, 2016). Gazprom supplied 158.56 
billion cubic meters of gas to European countries in 2015, 
according to the data provided by the company. Approxi-
mately 82 percent of the gas supply from Russia goes to 
Western Europe, while 18 percent is delivered to the Central 
Europe (European Commission: Gas transit route through 
Ukraine should be maintained).
Taking into consideration the existing picture, and des-
pite the fact that there are also other suppliers, but the pro-
portion of their supply is relatively low, it seems that Euro- 
pe will still remain extremely vulnerable to Russian control 
over gas supplies. In spite of Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 
2009, i.e. reducing its dependence on Ukraine as a transit 
country for gas, the most important entry point for Russian 
gas into the EU remains the “Brotherhood” pipeline, loca- 
ted on the Ukrainian Slovak border (transit of 52.5 bcm in 
2013) (Clingendael International Energy Programme, n.d). 
All these, however, indicate how urgent alternative energy 
supply routes are to be addressed.
Southern Gas Corridor - a Window of Opportunity 
for the EU?
The Southern Corridor is an initiative of the European Com-
mission to supply Europe with gas from Caspian and Middle 
Eastern regions. The Southern Gas Corridor is planned to 
transport gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Field Phase II, 
across Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania 
into the EU, terminating in Italy (BP Azerbaijan, n.d). The 
Corridor consists of three major pipelines: the existing South 
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), a pipeline of 691 km running from 
Baku across Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish border 
(BP Azerbaijan, n.d). After completing additional stages of 
the pipeline development and working at full capacity, the 
pipeline can transport up to 21 – 24 bcm of natural gas 
(Georgian Oil& Gas Corporation, 2013).
The second pipeline is 1850 km Trans Anatolian Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline (TANAP). The aim of the TANAP Project 
is to bring natural gas produced from Azerbaijan’s Shah 
Deniz-2 gas field, and other areas of the Caspian Sea, 
through Georgia, primarily to Turkey, and then to Europe 
(TANAP, n.d). TANAP should carry 16 bcm annually from 
the SCP, leave 6 bcm in Turkey and carry 10 bcm into the 
EU (Socor, 2014). 
The third planned pipeline is Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP). TAP will be 878 kilometers in length (Greece 550 km; 
Albania 215 km; Adriatic Sea 105 km; Italy 8 km). Its highest 
point will be 1,800 meters in Albania’s mountains, while its 
lowest will be 820 meters beneath the sea (Trans Adriat-
ic Pipeline, 2016c). TAP's initial capacity of 10 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) of gas per year is equivalent to the energy 
consumption of approximately seven million households in 
Europe. In the future, the addition of two extra compressor 
stations could double the throughput to more than 20 bcm 
as additional energy supplies come on stream in the wider 
Caspian region. The pipeline will also have the so-called 
“physical reverse flow” feature, allowing gas from Italy to be 
diverted to South East Europe if energy supplies are dis-
rupted or more pipeline capacity is required to bring addi-
tional gas into the region (Trans Adriatic Pipeline, 2016a).
Eurogas President Jean- Francois Cirelli stated that, 
the current volumes of Russia’s gas supplies to Europe 
cannot be completely substituted by other sources such as 
the SGC. However, the Eurogas President pointed out “it is 
important for Europe to try many different sources of gas” 
(Sputnik International, 2014).
Therefore, it can be stated that Southern Gas Corridor`s 
pivotal significance is based on the establishment of com-
petitiveness rather than substitution. However, other, oil 
and gas rich countries in the region, like Kazakhstan, Uz-
bekistan, and most importantly Turkmenistan may play im-
portant roles in changing the energy diversification climate 
in case they decide to look for diversified export markets 
and consequently to turn to the West.  Turkmenistan holds 
the largest natural gas reserves in Central Asia, of appro- 
ximately 265 trillion cubic feet, and with its involvement the 
SGC could ultimately meet European demand in its entirety 
(Kalandadze, 2014). Finally, as described in the EU’s Ener-
gy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, the Southern Corri-
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dor has the potential to incorporate natural gas from Iraq. 
Should the political conditions experience a shift though, 
even Iranian gas could be connected up. Iran, notably, has 
the world’s second largest gas reserves.
The Southern Gas Corridor will further contribute to the 
region’s political and economic independence. It will make 
cooperation closer between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tur-
key on the one hand and the EU on the other. This conse-
quently means strengthening regional political and econo-
mic ties, boosting further engagement by western powers 
in the region, reinforcing the region’s economic and political 
independence from Moscow (Kalandadze, 2014).
"The Caspian gas resources have the potential to be 
the most strategic supplies to the energy security of EU. 
The strong leadership and the effective decision making on 
crucial gas infrastructure, will determine the future of Euro-
pean energy security" (Livanios, 2013, p. 17). It will be "a 
step towards complementing Russia’s quasi-monopolistic 
position in Europe, and make it somewhat more difficult for 
the Kremlin to dominate the gas market in the EU" (Cohen, 
2014, p.4). Despite the great opportunities that can con-
siderably contribute to European energy security, together 
with long term economic security and stability of the region, 
there are obvious risks, however. The Caucasus region suf-
fers from several political, economic and ethnic-political  in-
stabilities, i.e. frozen conflicts: “military occupation and sub-
stantial uncontrolled armed presence of a foreign country 
make the region quite vulnerable and susceptible to further 
destabilization. Any kind of escalation has significant poten-
tial to jeopardize regional stability and the entire energy se-
curity concept" (Kalandadze, 2014). 
The Strategic Logic of the
Southern Gas Corridor
Koranyi (2014) presents strategic rationale of Southern Gas 
Corridor that underlines its true validity. First, with the Cor-
ridor Europe will be provided with a new route to secure 
natural gas supplies from the gas-rich Caspian Sea Basin. 
Besides, the Southern Corridor is designed to be expanded 
as additional natural gas becomes available in Azerbaijan, 
and if Turkmenistan seeks access to European markets to 
diversify its own exports and add a third route in addition to 
Russia and China. Moreover, the Southern Corridor has the 
capacity to incorporate natural gas from the Eastern Medi-
terranean as well as Iraq, and possibly from Iran too, which 
holds the world’s second largest gas reserves, although the 
related geopolitical and commercial challenges are alar-
ming.
Second, the Southern Corridor opens a new and com-
petitive route for the EU to import natural gas from producers 
not controlled by Gazprom and it will generate competition 
necessary for gas price to decrease. Therefore, this will 
make challenging for Gazprom to demand higher natural 
gas prices based on long-term contracts.
Third, Europe will need more gas in the long run, as 
coal - and, in some cases, nuclear - are phased out of the 
energy mix, and gas is ideally placed to serve as a backup 
resource to steady the uneven performance of renewables. 
As conventional reserves deplete, Europe’s dependence on 
gas imports is expected to grow further, from the current 64 
percent to above 80 percent by the end of the next decade.
Finally, it is expected that the Southern Gas Corridor will 
contribute to cementing Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s Euro- 
Atlantic orientation. It will also bring new supplies to Turkey, 
the fastest growing gas market in Europe, to decrease its 
dependence on Iran and Russia and to lay the foundation 
for a gas-trading hub that will lower gas prices for Turkey 
and its European neighbors (pp.3-4).
Besides, Southern Gas Corridor plays very important 
role for SEE - South East Europe. It is expected that total 
gas demand of SEE will increase from 26 bcm in 2012 to 
44 bcm by 2025 and 50 bcm by 2030 (Akhundzada, 2015). 
TAP can meet this growing demand in terms of supplying 
the additional required gas. This is why "lessening the de-
pendence on Russian gas is vital for safeguarding Europe’s 
security and integrity in the medium- and longterm" (Kora-
nyi, 2014, p.10).
The Russia-Ukraine gas crises have increased the 
importance of access to new and reliable gas sources for 
SEE. TAP represents a reliable gas supply for these coun-
tries. Through the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), TAP can 
bring natural gas to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Koso-
vo, Montenegro and Croatia, and to Bulgaria and Romania 
via the vertical interconnector project, namely the Greece- 
Bulgaria-Romania interconnectors. 
The Sense of Italian Market Selection
The selection of Italy as the final destination of the Southern 
Gas Corridor was surprising, because the Italian market is 
oversupplied and well diversified. The Shah Deniz Consor-
tium justifies its decision by pointing at the high gas prices 
in Italy and a strong commercially viable market. Moreover, 
Italy needs to import additional volumes of 7.7 bcm annu-
ally, due to the declining production of its own natural gas. 
It is estimated that every year Italy's gas production will 
be declining by 10 percent. From supply security reasons, 
Italy is also trying to replace some volumes of gas coming 
from Algeria and Libya. In addition, most of Italy's prospec-
tive LNG projects and pipeline projects are presently on 
hold (The Jamestown Foundation, 2013).
It is interesting to note that in case of oversupply in the 
Italian market, Azerbaijani experts consider this possible 
scenario as an asset for the Shah Deniz Consortium and 
Azerbaijan, because in this case the Shah Deniz gas can 
be easily supplied to neighboring countries through the gas 
pipeline from the Southern part of Italy northwards. Tran- 
sportation of Caspian gas can also reach the well-diversi-
fied markets in Western and Northern Europe. So, Italy can 
be considered not as the main destination market but as a 
transit corridor to markets in Europe, reaching up all the way 
to the North Sea.
This will enable all the shippers to transport gas from 
the Mediterranean to the North Sea, including the coun-
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tries along the pipeline. Italy's National Investment Strategy 
plans to exploit the country's geographic position to turn it 
into one of Europe's main transit countries by 2020 (The 
Jamestown Foundation, 2013).
Direct Economic Benefits from the
Southern Gas Corridor
Georgia is a strategic partner of the Southern Gas Corridor 
project. "Initial gas sales to Georgia and Turkey are sche-
duled for late 2019, with the first deliveries to Europe co-
ming early 2020. Once the operation is fully operation level, 
Georgia will receive an additional 1 billion cubic meters of 
gas from the South Corridor project" (Svanidze, 2016). Ac-
cording to the project agreement, Georgia is not only a tran-
sit country but also a natural gas consumer country. Geor-
gia has an option to purchase 5% of gas transported from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey for a favorable price. In addition, for 
20 years starting from the date when the project becomes 
operational, Georgia will purchase additional volume of gas 
about half a million cubic meters, from project investors 
at a special price (Georgian Oil & Gas Corporation, n.d). 
Moreover, in Georgia, the expansion of the South Caucasus 
Pipeline will be the largest single investment amounting to 
$2.2 billion (The Jamestown Foundation, 2013).
The route of Southern Gas Corridor shows that Turkey`s 
role as a transit country is more than simply crucial. It is 
clear that using Turkey’s geographical position to increase 
energy supply security is in the interest of both Europe and 
Turkey. "In Turkey, direct investment will be almost $8 bil-
lion and contribute to the Turkish economy. In Italy, TAP will 
provide 10–12 percent of Italy's gas supplies and, similarly 
to Albania, will contribute to diversifying supplies and im-
proving energy security. In Albania, TAP will be the largest 
direct investment, in fact the largest ever investment in the 
Albanian economy. It will also help Albania become a transit 
country, especially to other Balkan countries, through the 
Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline. In Greece, there will be a 1.5 billion 
euro ($2.04 billion) investment, which will create 2,000 jobs 
directly and 10,000 indirectly, bringing almost 450 million 
Euros ($612 million) of added value to the Greek economy" 
(The Jamestown Foundation, 2013).
So, with TAP it will be possible "to reach important con-
sumption centers of Europe over Italy but also to carry gas 
to Southeast European and the Balkan countries after 2025 
with the doubled transportation capacity. When we take into 
account that only the Russian gas is sold at these markets, 
new gas stream of the East over Turkey will weaken Russia 
in this game" (Belet, 2014, pp. 96-97).
Conclusion
It is not hard to notice that in the modern world diversifica-
tion of energy sources and suppliers is a pivotal means of 
improving energy security of the European Union. The EU 
stays fragile to external energy shocks and consequently 
needs an effective energy security strategy that will con-
tribute to its resilience towards energy supply challenges in 
the near future. There is an urgent necessity for alternative 
energy supply routes that will substantially lessen EU`s de-
pendency on Russian gas in the long term. From this per-
spective, Southern Gas Corridor is seen as a possible way 
out.
“With the potential to deliver 10 bcm to South Europe, 
and bypassing Russia, the SGC provides an excellent oppor-
tunity for Europe to diversify its supply and reduce Gazprom’s 
monopoly in the short to medium term. With the possibility 
of expanding the pipeline to include other Central Asian and 
potentially Iranian sources, Europe’s long term energy se-
curity could also benefit" (Kalandadze, 2014). It is important 
to point out that as many South East European countries 
are entirely dependent on a single supplier of natural gas, 
and it leaves them completely unprotected to challenges in 
supply and uncompetitive pricing. Some other countries in 
the region, like Albania, are not even on the gas grid. They 
completely rely on coal and oil to meet their energy needs. 
TAP will pave the way for new sources of energy to enter 
these markets and promote development of their energy 
sectors (TAP, 2016).
Despite the fact that this Southern Gas Corridor project 
highlights its effectiveness in terms of contribution to reduce 
Russian monopoly, it faces obvious challenges too, namely, 
frozen, unsettled conflicts in the South Caucasian states. 
Besides, it cannot be surprising that any kind of Western 
presence in the post-Soviet area may be perceived by Rus-
sia as a direct threat to its interests and in this case to its 
energy monopoly. This means that instability puts the region 
under threat together with the project. Accordingly, EU and 
NATO need to take considerable measures to avoid desta-
bilization in the region and play much more crucial role in 
conflict resolution. 
A guaranteed successful implementation of the Southern 
Gas Corridor project directly means that it will secure diver-
sified energy supply to the European Union. So, Southern 
Gas Corridor is a window of opportunity for Europe, it is not 
a myth but already an obvious reality.
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